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Information operations will represent a core Army XXI capability. They will allow for 
unprecedented battlespace awareness, increased speed and tempo in land warfare and, 
ultimately, for Army information dominance. These expectations must be tempered with 
the knowledge that they represent the institutional Army view of information operations. 
Other views exist which challenge current Army warfighting assumptions. 
The central argument developed in this important paper concerns whether information 
operations will be an adjunct to current operational methods, basically a force multiplier, or 
a totally new operational mechanism which will provide warfighting capabilities which 
heretofore did not exist. Both schools of thought are analyzed in this paper along with a 
discussion of information operations definitions and target sets and the land warfare 
implications of information operations. 
The value of this paper is derived from its ability to generate debate on an issue of 
central importance to the Army. As the victors of the Cold and Gulf Wars, our approach to 
information operations is inherently more conservative than that of many of our future 
opponents, some of whom will rely upon cyberterrorism and other asymmetric attempts to 
overcome our battlefield advantages. Thus, while information operations will allow us to 
greatly advance our traditional warfighting capabilities, we must recognize that they may 
open up new warfighting venues which will need to be explored and debated to ensure that 
the Army retains its battlefield dominance into the early 21st century. 
GORDON R. SULLIVAN 





Information Operations and the Conduct of Land Warfare 
This paper focuses on the implications of information operations (10) on the U.S. 
Army's conduct of land warfare over the next decade.1 This transitional period from the 
experimental Force XXI to the digitized Army XXI offers many promises, potentials and 
even pitfalls for the world's predominant land power force. BG James M. Dubik, USA, has 
recognized this in his earlier Institute of Land Warfare paper Creating Combat Power for 
the 21st Century? 
The term "information operations" conjures up many images. To some the vision of 
Heinlein's classic Starship Troopers comes to mind with its Mobile Infantry (M.I.) forces 
in high-tech body armor.3 Armed with vast amounts of individual firepower and linked into 
information nets, these soldiers provide one archetype of the future Army force. Another 
vision is at odds with the high-tech warrior tradition. It is that of out-of-shape armchair 
soldiers sitting behind their computer terminals launching war-winning cyberattacks at the 
stroke of a key. A third vision is derived from the cyberpunk genre. It is that of Johnny 
Mnemonic-type individuals, with hardwires in their brains and enough downloaded 
information to make a modern supercomputer look like a kid's cheap toy. Such enhanced 
individuals would give a whole new meaning to the concept of the "special forces" of the 
future and, while some truth probably exists in each of these visions, for now that is all they 
are — visions of the future. 
No underlying thesis or policy will be consciously promoted in this paper with regard 
to the Army's relationship to information operations except for the self-evident fact that 
they are becoming increasingly critical to its continued battlefield dominance. The paper 
has two goals: First, by focusing on the important transitional period we are now facing, 
this paper will show the basis of information operations thinking and the two competing 
schools of thought which have developed, outlining areas of potential synthesis between 
them. Second, this paper will assess the potential impact of these operations on land 
warfare and analyze some of the issues associated with them. 
At the outset, however, current definitions and perceptions of information operations, 
and ultimately of information itself, will be reviewed and discussed in hopes of seeing the 
divergence in and perhaps coming closer to a common frame of reference to guide the 
following discussion. 
Defining Information Operations 
"Information operations" is a relatively recent term. In the current Army Field Manual 
(FM) 100-5, Operations, June 1993, the term is not even mentioned.5 Early definitions of 
this term can be found in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, 1 August 1994: 
Vlll 
Continuous combined arms operations that enable, enhance, and protect the 
commander's decision cycle and execution while influencing an opponent's; 
operations are accomplished through effective intelligence, command and control, 
and command and control warfare operations, supported by all available friendly 
information systems; battle command information operations are conducted across 
the full range of military operations.6 
and in FM 100-6, Information Operations, of 21 August 1996: 
Continuous military operations within the MIE [Military Information Environment] 
that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process, and 
act on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military 
operations; 10 include interacting with the GIE [Global Information Environment] 
and exploiting or denying an adversary's information and decision capabilities. 
The value of information to the conduct of land warfare has been commented on by 
General Dennis Reimer, Army Chief of Staff. On 4 September 1996, he stated, "The 
evolving military information environment will fundamentally change the way we, the 
Army, conduct operations in peace and conflict. 10 includes all measures, both offensive 
and defensive, taken to achieve information dominance. The Army will integrate 10 into 
every aspect of Army XXI."8 
Two years later, some debate exists concerning the nature and value of information 
operations to Army XXI. Early Army definitions are in variance with current Joint Force 
perceptions. Further, while information operations are recognized as being potentially of 
great value, their actual value to date is disputed. One school of thought posits that they 
represent an adjunct to current operations — the end result of which is to enhance current 
Army capabilities by making what it has traditionally done better by means of a force 
multiplier effect. Another school of thought suggests that information operations will 
provide the Army with new capabilities. Instead of being a simple adjunct to current 
operations, according to this school, the influence of the "information revolution" on 
warfare will result in the redefinition of operations themselves. Both schools do agree that 
information operations has become a dominant, albeit at times ambiguous, concept for 
Army professionals to wrestle with. 
As can be seen even within the Army, one of the maddening aspects of information 
operations is defining them. This is particularly troublesome for those who did not grow up 
with computers and who inherently do not feel comfortable working with them. Further, 
information operations has become something of the current buzz word. Pepper your 
conversation a few times with the term and it shows you are up to date concerning cutting 
edge military thinking. Another major problem with the term is that two individuals can be 
discussing it and talk right past each other. An Internet-based attack, the use of 
propaganda, and even terrorism can be labeled as forms of information operations. Unless 
the individuals can agree upon the broader definition of the term, their examples have little 
in common with each other. Let us now look at the Joint Force definition of information 
operations and a number of typologies of the concepts involved. 
IX 
The best information operations (10) definition is currently provided by the Department 
of Defense. They are defined as "actions taken to affect adversary information and 
information systems while defending one's own information and information systems."9 
While, as viewed previously, early Army definitions were subordinated to more traditional 
commander and force needs, the Joint Force definition is much more abstract in nature.10 It 
literally decouples the concept of operations from the physical environment in which the 
Army is used to campaigning. As an outcome, cyberspace takes on its own form of 
existence and becomes, in its own right, a form of battlespace where information 
operations can be conducted. For those soldiers who think solely in terms of tanks, 
helicopters and artillery pieces, this conceptual leap is extremely difficult to grasp, much 
less accept. 
Information warfare (IW), in turn, is conceptually subordinated to information 
operations. It is defined as "information operations conducted during time of crisis or 
conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or 
adversaries."11 The basic concept behind Joint Force information operations can be 
expressed in table form for better ease of understanding (see table 1). 
Table 1. Basic Information Operations 
Defend Our Attack Their 
Information Information 
Information Systems Information Systems 
The question which must then be asked is, "What is meant by information and 
information systems?" The definition of information used in Concept for Future Joint 
Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010 is "data collected from the environment and 
processed into a usable form." 12 Data is in turn defined as "representation of facts, 
concepts, or instructions in a formalized manner suitable for communication, interpretation, 
or processing by humans or by automated means. Any representations such as characters 
or analog quantities to which meaning is or might be assigned."13 Based upon these 
perceptions, an information attack upon an opposing force results in the disruption of its 
cognitive hierarchy. This is done by targeting data — a processing function. This will 
directly affect higher-level functions such as cognition and judgment.14 
An earlier information typology was provided in War in the Information Age. It divides 
information as follows: 
Four basic forms of information will form the core upon which America's 
information age Army procedures and organizations will be built. First is content 
information, the simple inventory of information about the quantity, location and 
types of items. Second is form information, the descriptions of the shape and 
composition of objects. Third is behavior information, three dimensional 
simulation that will predict behavior of at least physical objects, ultimately being 
able to "wargame" courses of action. Finally, action information is the kind of 
information that allows operations to take the appropriate action quickly.15 
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The attack and defense of each of these four forms of information could also fit into the 
information operations mandate. In the more recent Athena's Camp, three views of 
information are discussed: "The first considers information in terms of the inherent 
message, the second in terms of the medium of production, storage, transmission, and 
reception. The emerging third view transcends the former two; it speculates that 
information may be a physical property — as physical as mass and energy, and inherent in 
all matter." 16 The first view generally compliments the Joint Vision 2010 processing 
definition based upon information operations directed against data. It also seems to include 
information which is viewed as "organized data" — as opposed to raw data, which is 
disjointed in nature because it has not been processed through some sort of filtering system. 
The second view, which is medium- or conduit-based, would appear to fall under the 
rubric of information systems rather than information. It will be discussed later. 
The third view based upon information as a physical property, a structuralist 
perspective, proposes: 
Information is as basic to physical reality as matter and energy — all material 
objects are said to embody not only matter and energy, but also "information." The 
spectrum for this view runs from modestly regarding information as an output of 
matter and energy; to regarding information as equal in importance to matter and 
energy; to regarding information as even more fundamental than matter and energy. 
Information, then, is an embedded physical property of all objects that exhibit 
organization and structure. This applies to dirt clods as well as DNA strands. 
While this cutting edge scientific view will have many implications for future 
information operations, in tandem with the development of the new sciences of chaos and 
complexity theory and other postmechanical and nonlinear disciplines, it will more heavily 
influence the Army After Next (AAN) than the more immediate Army XXI.18 
Over the course of the next decade, it is probably more useful to view two forms of 
information existing based upon message and processing considerations. The first form, 
data, is raw, disorganized and unfilitered in nature. The vast majority of battlespace 
information is gathered from human and electronic sensors. The second form, information, 
represents data which has been filtered and organized by human and electronic processors. 
Information represents a smaller, but more valuable, resource pool than data and is only as 
good as the validity of the data provided and the sophistication of the processor involved.19 
Many information-specific typologies can exist, including the previously mentioned one 
based upon content, form, behavior and action information. 
The question concerning what is an information system must now be addressed. In 
Concept for Future Joint Operations this is defined as: 
Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, 
equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander's 
exercise of command and control across the range of military operations, by 
collecting, processing, analyzing, archiving, and disseminating information. 
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The current Special Forces definition represents a variation on this theme: "The 
personnel and equipment to manage, display, transport and disseminate information needed 
for rapid decision making necessary for victory."21 The medium view mentioned earlier 
suggests that such a system is composed of information production, storage, transmission 
and reception. 
Probably the most useful way of defining a generic information system is to recognize 
that it requires seven basic components to minimally function.22 These are sensors which 
provide data, processors who filter and organize it into information, receptors who utilize 
it, databases where data and information is stored, transmitters who disseminate data and 
information, rules which define system operation and structure, and synergy which allows 
a system to function better than the total sum of its parts. These components are not 
mutually exclusive. A receptor, for example, might be a decisionmaker or a trigger-puller 
or could just as well be a sensor which has been provided with new information concerning 
its sensing mission. What must also be recognized is that an individual soldier or a tank and 
its crew can be thought of as a miniature information system form even though the system 
which is being discussed in this paper applies to Army XXI itself. An applied view of 
information operations can now be expressed (see table 2). It provides the conceptual basis 
from which the conduct of Army XXI information operations can be discussed. 
Table 2. Applied Information Operations 























Army XXI Information Operations 
Derived from table 2, nine basic target sets exist in information operations. These 
target sets can be applied against the popularized notion of the Clausewitzian trinity of a 
nation-state represented by its military, government and people. Army XXI information 
operations, by necessity, will focus upon the military informational environment. However, 
attributes of the informational environments belonging to the government and the people 
will impact the success of Army XXI on the battlefield. Increasing Army reliance upon 
civilian Internet switches represents one example. If the Internet were to become disrupted 
by hackers, operating independently or in the employ of a foreign government or criminal 
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organization while a military operation was in progress, information exchange between 
Army units could become severely disrupted. Another example can be derived from a 
recent incident. On 25 June 1998, the computerized reservation system belonging to 
American Airlines went down for three hours for unknown reasons. Flight delays resulted 
which ranged from 15 minutes to two hours.23 Civilian carriers provide the Army with an 
additional surge capability to project its forces immediately. If the reservation systems of 
these carriers were targeted on an ongoing basis, the resulting chaos could disrupt such a 
surge capability, not to mention the massive problems it would generate for business 
professionals and other air travellers.24 
When specifically applied to the military information environment, these nine target 
sets can be broken down into two derived from information and seven derived from 
characteristics of information systems. Data which have been obtained by sensors and 
information generated by processors can be attacked in three basic ways: by means of 
destruction, degradation and alteration. The destruction of data and information is very 
straightforward. A string of Os and Is representing bits of information is eliminated. 
Degradation of data and information is the partial elimination of a string of Os and Is so 
that message gaps appear. Data and information alteration is the resequencing of a string of 
Osandls.25 
Of these three forms of attack, alteration is the most threatening but also the most 
complicated to undertake. It can not only result in wrong decisions and actions being made 
but also pollutes the data and information belonging to a military force. This can produce 
ambiguity within a force concerning the validity and reliability of sections of its knowledge 
pool. For example, if the text of an online helicopter repair manual, say for the AH-64D 
Longbow Apache, were altered leading to a disaster for either the helicopter crewmen or 
the ground crew, all online repair manuals would become suspect. Unless proofed line-by- 
line or, far more likely, reloaded from secure backups protected by strong firewalls or 
physical air-gaps, their use would be denied to Army personnel. Digital destruction, on the 
other hand, would result in the erasure of data and information which would be quite 
obvious, would not result in faulty helicopter repairs being made, and is more easily solved. 
Possibly a more insidious example would be that of changing the dosage of medications for 
Army personnel or altering the information concerning the effects of prescribing two 
medications together so that fatal or near-fatal combinations could result. 
Sensors, which range from close-in to stand-off forms, can be targeted by denying 
them data, altering the data provided, disrupting their sensing capabilities or destroying 
their capability to function. Data denial would focus on electromagnetic signature 
suppression and other techniques such as frequency-hopping broadcasts so that sensors are 
unable to gather data. Data alteration allows sensors to obtain data that the opposing force 
wants to be obtained. This could allow a tank to broadcast a truck signature and vice versa 
or create the illusion that more forces exist than really do. Disruption of sensing capabilities 
can be undertaken by providing "noise" in the appropriate segment of the electromagnetic 
spectrum to achieve a masking effect or by the employment of obscurants which can be 
used to coat the surfaces of sensing devices, making them opaque to electromagnetic 
radiation.   Sensor destruction can be  achieved physically, by targeting  them with 
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conventional weaponry or by nonlethals such as destructive microbes, or nonphysically via 
electromagnetic pulse which would burn out their components. 
Processors, both human and machine, can be attacked in order to degrade or influence 
analysis and decisionmaking functions. Providing processors altered data, via the sensors of 
their information net, would be the most basic form of such an attack because skewed data 
input results in skewed information output. Machine processors can also be targeted by 
corrupting their algorithms with a virus or providing them, as in the case of expert systems, 
with contradictory instructions which can result in the machine equivalent of a nervous 
breakdown. Humans, on the other hand, suffer greatly when faced with excessive 
ambiguity. If a human decisionmaker, such as a foreign military commander, can be 
purposefully targeted in this regard, his or her analytical process will suffer. Further, 
humans have a number of basic biological needs, such as sleep, and if such needs can be 
denied to them for extended periods of time their decisionmaking capabilities will become 
severely degraded. 
Receptors are vulnerable to sender deception. They can be made to either believe that 
information being sent to them is false, as in the case of its appearing to come from an 
opposing force when it is coming from their own force, or that information which is being 
sent to them is true, as in the case of its appearing to come from their own force when it is 
coming from the opposing force (i.e., spoofing). In the first instance, information is not 
being accepted when it should be, and in the second instance, information is being accepted 
when it shouldn't. Both forms of sender deception can cause confusion and disruption to an 
opposing force. Anything from e-mail messages to phone conversations to digital radio 
transmissions to videotapes can be affected in this manner. 
Databases represent the physical hosts and mediums in which data and information are 
stored. This hardware, like all hardware, is susceptible to physical and upper-tier nonlethal 
attack. While less sophisticated than targeting data and information itself via cyberspace, 
database targeting will result in either informational destruction or the denial of its use until 
database repairs are made or the surviving information they contain is salvaged and 
transferred to another database. 
Transmitters are representative of communication devices and protocols. These are 
susceptible to traditional forms of attack based upon electronic warfare, jamming 
measures, and precision fires. As in conventional operations, this is one of the most 
desirable target sets to attack because it provides the informational linkages within and 
between military units. 
Rules such as standard operating procedures, the laws of war, and military ethics 
moderate and regulate warfare.26 Rules help to establish warfare as a legitimate form of 
organized political violence (i.e., an extension of politics by other means) between 
sovereign states as opposed to mass murder, ethnic cleansing, terrorism and other forms of 
criminal activity waged by nonstate actors and illegitimate despots. Western rules of war 
are easy to attack because they represent artificial political conventions. By removing their 
uniforms and military insignia from their vehicles and mixing themselves in with civilian 
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populations, many non-Western forces actively engage in applied information operations 
against U.S. forces. 
Synergy in an information system results in a military force gaining battlefield 
advantage by fusing together the individual contributions of its components into something 
greater than the sum of its parts. This synergy allows for faster OODA (Observe-Orient- 
Decide-Act) loops, reaction times and decision cycles to take place. By understanding an 
opposing force's information system process this synergy can be attacked and degraded, 
disrupted or destroyed as an outcome of coordinated attacks upon the other information 
operations target sets. As an example, the complete disruption of any one category of target 
sets, such as transmitters, will cripple an information system. Attacking the proper 
combinations of target sets may also achieve this desired effect by means of a cascading 
effect. 
Based on the above typology, Army branches can attack specialized parts of an 
adversary's information and information system, and also help to protect their own assets. 
The tasking model used by U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) 
breaks down information operations into those units/functions which defend information, 
attack information and provide information operations enablers (see table 3). Such actions 
can be active or passive in nature. A secure firewall between brigade networks would 
represent a passive form of defense, while installing Blitzkrieg software, which recognizes 
hacking attempts and repels them, would be an active form of defense. The INSCOM 
model appears to be but one approach to undertaking information operations. Because this 
concept is so new and dynamic, no general Army consensus exists in regards to which 
combat, support or service branch should undertake which information operations mission. 
Table 3. INSCOM Information Operations Model ,29 
Defend Information Attack Information Information Operations Enablers 
• Operations Security • Electronic Warfare • Public Affairs 
• Information Security • Computer Network Attack • Civil Affairs 
• Communications Security • Psychological Operations • Intelligence 
• Computer Security • Special Information • Support 
• Physical Security Operations • Battle Management 
• Network Management • Physical Attack Command, Control & 
• Counter Deception • Deception Communications 
• Counter Psychological 
Operations 
• Counterintelligence 
• Law Enforcement Liaison 
Competing Views of Information Operations 
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As discussed in the introduction to this paper, two schools of thought exist in regard to 
the significance of information operations. The major perceptions of these schools of 
thought are highlighted below: 
The Force Multiplier School. The operational concepts developed in Joint Vision 2010 
— dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused 
logistics — are derived from informational superiority and other joint warfighting capability 
objectives. Information superiority, however, is the only objective which is integral to all 
four operational concepts.30 Such superiority is defined as "the capability to collect, 
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying 
an adversary's ability to do the same."31 This form of strategic guidance allows Army XXI 
to become better at what it already does, which is to seize terrain and destroy opposing 
conventional military forces belonging to other nation-states. Such traditionalist concepts 
fully complement initiatives to take the current mechanized force of Bradley Fighting 
Vehicles, Abrams Tanks, et al. and digitize them via appliques. 
Wired fighting vehicles, artillery and helicopters benefit from information operations by 
means of sensors which can better identify opposing forces, thus minimizing the "fog of 
war" and providing what is termed dominant battlespace knowledge. 
An interactive "picture" which will yield much more accurate assessments of 
friendly and enemy operations within the area of interest. Although this will not 
eliminate the fog of war, dominant battlespace awareness will improve situational 
awareness, decrease response time, and make the battlespace considerably more 
transparent to those who achieve it.32 
The logic goes that if an enemy can be sensed, he can then be fixed in time and space, 
and killed with precision munitions or neutralized with nonlethal force. Such advantages as 
this will allow Army units to project current combat power levels with fewer personnel. As 
a case in point, Army heavy division size is currently being reduced from more than 18,000 
to 15,700 soldiers because of efficiencies caused by information technologies in logistics. 
It should be noted that this personnel savings comes prior to a division digitization, slated 
to take place in 2000, and a corps digitization scheduled for 2004.34 
Virtually all aspects of Army operations can be made more efficient via information 
technologies. In the case of nonstate war in urban environments, lessons learned from the 
recent Russian debacle portray the utility of these operations: 
One of the major insights gained from the Russian experience in Grozny concerns 
information dominance. The importance of being able to control broadcasting 
capabilities, suppress inflammatory information, influence attitudes, and hamper or 
intercept information flow within hostile elements was abundantly clear. Russian 
forces were unable to do these things and suffered accordingly. Given the array of 
communications links — TV, radio, telephone, cellular phone, internet, etc., the 
challenge of achieving information dominance is formidable.35 
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Fortunately, in Bosnia, such mistakes were avoided by Army and allied forces in 
Operation Joint Endeavor. In fact, a well-coordinated information campaign based on 
publication information (PI), psychological operations (PSYOPS), and civil-military 
cooperation (CMIC) was undertaken.36 
Even with these many benefits, challenges exist in regard to information operations as a 
whole. One concerns how to get information to tactical units and back to the commanders. 
The older communications structure was built upon voice and low speed data transmissions 
while "the information component of future military operations will primarily be comprised 
of computer data, imagery, video and much less voice commo than in the past."37 Another 
challenge may exist in regard to the potential for micromanagement by senior officers and 
junior officers becoming overloaded with too much information. Issues such as this will 
need to be explored and solved if problems do arise. As an outcome of digitization, 
hierarchical thinking will be replaced with a more networked approach to warfighting. This 
will offer new opportunities in regard to fighting toward a common battlefield image but 
will also result in potential dilemmas in regard to the current organizational structure, with 
some formations and possibly even rank structures no longer potentially needed as Army 
units get flatter. 
What is known is that commercial technology will begin to provide an increasing 
segment of the hardware Army XXI will rely upon. This exploitation of commercial 
technology will provide the Army with many advantages in regard to technical 
breakthroughs but must be tempered with the realization that such technology can be 
bought on the global market by anyone.38 While the force multiplication effects of 
information operations are fully recognized, the cost of digitization is becoming an 
increasing concern. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has stated that his service 
cannot afford digitization and suggests that to a degree this may also be true for the Army 
because of the declining defense budget.39 If this is the case, then Army XXI may 
ultimately comprise only selected divisions of the Army who will gain the full benefits that 
information operations will provide.40 
The New Capabilities School. It has become an accepted fact that nonstate challengers 
and rogue nation-states have no hope of taking on and defeating the premier landpower 
force in the world today in conventional warfare. The Army is simply too good at what it 
does. The down side of ruling the battlefield is that our opponents have no choice but to 
replace symmetrical warfighting with asymmetrical counters when facing the Army. On a 
physical level, they are exploring new combat capabilities based upon weapons of mass 
destruction. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons offer many possibilities especially 
when used by small terrorist cells which cannot be traced back to their employers. 
Our focus, however, is in regard to the digital or cyber dimension. Information 
operations allow criminal, guerrilla and other rogue entities a new operational style which 
previously did not exist. A force multiplication effect is useless to such entities because 
they have no traditional combat power to multiply. Rather, information operations in this 
regard are more visionary in nature and represent an asymmetric form of warfare based 
upon what could be termed "weapons of mass disruption."41 This potential has not gone 
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unnoticed by governmental authorities with regard to the threat posed to our nation's 
infrastructure.42 One National Defense University researcher has observed: 
The implications of warfare in the information arena are enormous. First, national 
homelands are not sanctuaries. They can be attacked directly, and potentially 
anonymously, by foreign powers, criminal organizations, or nonnational actors such 
as ethnic groups, renegade corporations, or zealots of almost any persuasion. 
Traditional military weapons cannot be interposed between the information warfare 
threat and society. 
Second, even where traditional combat conditions exist (hostile military forces face 
one another in a terrain-defined battlespace), kinetic weapons are only part of the 
arsenal available to adversaries. Indeed, electronic espionage and sabotage, 
psychological warfare attacks delivered via mass media, digital deception, and 
hacker attacks on the adversaries' command and control systems will be used to 
neutralize most traditional forces and allow concentration of fire and decisive force 
at the crucial time and place in the battlespace.43 
Examples of this new operational style mentioned in another National Defense 
University paper include: 
♦ A "trap door" hidden in the code controlling switching centers of the Public Switched 
Network could cause portions of it to fail on command. 
♦ A mass dialing attack by personal computers might overwhelm a local phone system. 
♦ A "logic bomb" or other intrusion into rail computer systems might cause trains to be 
misrouted and, perhaps, crash. 
♦ A computer intruder might remotely alter the formulas of medication at pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, or personal medical information, such as blood type, in medical 
databases. 
♦ A concentrated e-mail attack might overwhelm or paralyze a significant network. 
♦ An "infoblockade" could permit little or no electronic information to enter or leave a 
nation's borders.44 
For information concerning similar concepts, refer to Appendix 1, Army War 
College IW Tutorial Terms. Conceptually, this form of warfighting can be considered a 
form of bond-relationship targeting (i.e., the links between things) as opposed to precision 
strike, which targets things themselves. A proposed definition for this form of operations is 
as follows: 
Rather than gross physical destruction or injury, the desired end state is to create 
tailored disruption within a thing, between it and other things, or between it and its 
environment by degrading or severing the bonds and relationships which define its 
existence.45 
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Because Army special operations forces do not rely upon forms of traditional combat 
power as do conventional Army forces, it would seem that they would be more apt to view 
information operations as a new capability rather than as a force multiplier like nonstate 
groups. If this is the case, they may begin to rely upon offensive information operations as a 
primary means of disruption attack against opposing forces. Within the next decade, 
lessons learned by Army special operations forces may offer little utility to conventional 
forces in this regard; however, in the long run, what is now considered an unconventional 
form of information warfare could become the new norm. 
In addition to Army special operations forces, the employment of IO by private security 
corporations is another trend which must be considered. The Army's recent decision to 
choose Internet Security Systems, Inc., to defend its cyber-assets in over 400 U.S. Army 
facilities worldwide suggests that the private sector may be more adept than traditional 
military institutions at waging war within higher-dimensional battlespace. If this is the 
case it would represent an ominous trend because cyberspace would ultimately help to 
undermine the warmaking monopoly held by the public institutions of the nation-state, as it 
is already doing to concepts of national sovereignty. 
Land Warfare Implications 
Of the two schools of thought previously discussed, the perception of information 
operations as a force multiplier will presumably dominate over the course of the next 
decade or so within Army circles — out to about 2010. Army XXI by necessity will exist 
in two worlds — partially mechanical and partially digital. First, it will draw its firepower 
largely from preexisting hardware that was designed for the Cold War security 
environment.47 The hardware sunk costs and preexisting training and support base dictate 
no less in an era of declining defense expenditures. 
At the same time, most of the Army's senior leadership will still be traditionalist in its 
view of the influence of technology, especially information technology, on the conduct of 
land warfare. Bolted onto this hardware will be information devices which will multiply its 
combat power and effectiveness. Given such a near-term scenario, information operations 
will be viewed as a means to an operational end, that is, as a force multiplier for 
conventional operations and probably not as a viable operational style in itself. 
The primary danger which exists with traditionalist-school thinking is that of being 
lulled into a false sense of security. Because Army XXI will be so far in advance of its 
nearest competitors, it may become fashionable to suggest that no one will ever be able to 
catch up to the Army in warfighting capacity. This would assume that information 
operations will remain subordinate to conventional operations over the long term. As a 
result, land warfare forces would retain their current capabilities and continually refine 
them.48 No basis exists to support such an assumption. Rather, it is suggested that 
information operations may mature to the point of becoming an operational style in itself 
and/or fuse with conventional operations to become a dual-dimensional operational hybrid 
which is physically- and cyber-based. This maturation will develop primarily because of the 
development of asymmetric attempts of our opponents at undermining Army XXI combat 
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power, Army special operations forces experimentation in these areas, growing private 
security information operations capability, and the recognition of these trends by senior 
Army leaders.49 This would result in the development of a whole new battlefield upon 
which the Army After Next, rather than Army XXI, will be more suited to function.50 
This perception brings up two land warfare issues which need to be further studied 
with regard to information operations. The first concerns the impact of advanced 
technology and concepts on land warfare. Do such technologies and concepts tend to get 
designated as force multipliers by the dominant army of the era (the winners) to allow it to 
do what it does even better? This would be in contrast to such technologies and concepts 
being designated as a new form of operations by inferior armies or groups (the losers) who 
have no stake in the prevailing military status quo. A historical example of this 
phenomenon is represented by the development of the tank in the 1920s and 1930s. For the 
allies in World War n, the tank was early on considered an infantry support weapon which 
provided mobile firepower, hence a force multiplier, rather than a key element of a new 
operational concept as was then developed by the German army. Another example of this 
phenomenon would be the development and employment of functional field artillery, 
coupled with the levee en masse and other innovations by the French during its 
Revolutionary Wars of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. This "loser" army of the late 
Absolutist age went on to redefine warfare between the armies of nation-states because it 
saw the advanced technology and concepts which had developed as the basis of new 
operations and not as a force multiplier as did its competitors. 
The issue of advanced technology and concepts either as a force multiplier or as the 
basis of new operations will heavily impact the future Army. It will likely result in the 
development of a second issue — when, and if, the Army should organize itself around 
qualitatively new operational styles. As previously mentioned, out to 2010 or so 
information operations as a force multiplier will presumably dominant conventional Army 
force thinking, and rightly so. From 2010 on, however, information operations as a real 
operational style in itself and/or as part of the basis of a dual-dimensional operational 
hybrid will begin to make itself more pronounced. The time frame from 2010 to 2025 may 
thus become a critical period for Army planners. It will represent the last vestiges of Cold 
War-influenced combat hardware mated to digital appliques and the introduction of 
qualitatively new systems which possess organic informational abilities and the new 
operational capabilities they will provide.51 
In the short term, however, the future looks bright with regard to the transition from 
Force XXI to Army XXI and continued Army land warfare dominance with the addition of 
information operations as a force multiplier. The Army is second to none as a landpower 
force and can no longer be defeated in a traditional battlefield setting with conventional 
arms and tactics. This recognized invulnerability, however, is both a blessing and a bane 
because, as discussed in this paper, America's opponents will ultimately attempt to turn 
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Cryptology: Cryptology is a weapon of information warfare designed to encrypt and crack 
secure communications respectively. Despite significant advances in cryptography, 
cryptanalysis will continue to be an important weapon aided by equally significant 
advances in computing power. 
Decision Support: As in any decision process, the more information available the higher 
the probability of arriving at a useful solution. Likewise, computer decision support is also 
a key weapon in information warfare and especially in defensive information warfare. 
Decision support can be used to detect attacks, identify the type of attack, generate 
defensive options, evaluate options, and perform damage assessments. In a similar manner, 
an adversary's decision support system can be delayed, or disrupted with erroneous data. 
Destructive Microbes: Researchers are also working on developing microbes which eat 
electronics components so that, in the event of conflict, these microbes could be introduced 
into an adversary's electronics equipment to cause failure. 
Electromagnetic Pulse: Electromagnetic pulse weapons could be used to knock out 
enemy electronics equipment. Suitcase-sized devices have been developed to do just that. 
Infrastructure Attacks: Various possible operations with obvious effects include 
knocking out telephone switches, crashing stock markets, attacking electronic routers for 
rail systems, attacking bank accounts, disrupting air traffic control, and denying service 
with, for instance, a ping attack. Note: The "ping" attack gets its name from old age sonar 
techniques. Within a network, a computer can send systematic queries to all addresses and 
analyze the associated return time, very similar to sonar. Net groups with similar times of 
return can be associated into a hierarchical structure. 
Malicious Software: Viruses: computer programs that can infect systems and cause 
damage. They are usually hidden within safe-looking programs (usually shareware or 
freeware). Trojan horse: a computer program that enables the disseminator of the program 
to access the system that interacts with the program. A Trojan horse is different from a 
virus in that a virus can be duplicated thousands of times and function according to a 
previous set of instructions, while a Trojan horse is designed to facilitate access and 
interaction between its creator and the system it infiltrates. Worm: a computer program that 
infests network environments and copies itself over and over again. Worms can take up 
more and more memory and disk space until they stop the computer cold. The famous 
Internet worm of November 1988 replicated itself on more than 6,000 networks around the 
world. Clipper: hardware that can automatically encrypt and decrypt data. It has a trapdoor 
which would enable federal authorities to open with a key and monitor data. 
Psychological Operations: Psychological operations (PSYOPS) using all available 
information means to form a desired public opinion. PSYOPS benefits from the ability to 
conduct market research and analysis of regional data. As a result, customized messages 
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can be generated for each target sector of society. PSYOPS was very successful in the U.S. 
reinstatement of Haiti's president. 
Spoofing: Spoofing is an attempt to send a falsified message to someone. For example, I 
could dial up a university phone registration system pretending to be someone I have a 
grudge against, and drop their classes. Since these systems are automated, all I would need 
to know in most cases is a person's Social Security number and birthdate. 
Stand-Off and Close-in Sensors: For military applications, the use of stand-off and close- 
in sensors to gather data could be considered an information warfare weapon. 
Van Eck Radiation: Van Eck radiation is the radiation which all electronic devices emit. 
Specialized receivers can pick up this radiation and tap a wealth of information. 
Fortunately, there are various safeguards against this type of attack. 
Video Morphing: Video morphing is a weapon that could be used in a manner similar to 
that in the movie "Forrest Gump" to make an enemy leader appear to say things he or she 
didn't in fact say, undermining credibility. 
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